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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG or the Convention) does not expressly state whether 
the remedy of disgorgement of profits can be awarded in cases of breach 
of contract. In this article, we argue that the disgorgement of profits is 
available both as a method for the calculation of damages under Art. 74 
and as a remedy on its own when the remedy of compensatory damages 
fails to fulfill its functions. Therefore, we argue that the disgorgement of 
profits is in line with Art. 7(1) and Art. 7(2) of the Convention. However, 
the availability of the disgorgement of profits shall not be understood as 
undermining the primacy of compensatory damages and should be 
accepted only in exceptional cases, namely where second sales of non-
substitutable goods and breaches of certain contractual stipulations make 
the calculation of loss impossible or impracticable. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When looking at the remedies system of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ (CISG), 
typical contract law remedies that can generally be found in national 
legislations are apparent, such as avoidance, specific performance, 
damages, the right to withhold performance and the right to ask for repair 
or replacement. However, the remedy of disgorgement of profits is 
nowhere mentioned in the Convention,  travaux préparatoires, or initial 
commentaries.1 This should not come as a surprise because the 
disgorgement of profits has only recently become a popular academic and 
judicial topic,2 and when the Convention was drafted, it was not thought 
of as a remedy in case of a breach.3 The primary remedy for a breach of 
contract in common law systems has traditionally been damages and, in 
civil law, specific performance;4 therefore, the theoretic race between the 
remedies has concerned these two, leaving the disgorgement issue out of 
the discussion. It follows that the (unconscious) absence of the 
disgorgement of profits alone does not allow us to claim that the 
 
1 Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, ‘Disgorgement of Profits under the CISG’, in Ingeborg 
Scwenzer and Lisa Spagnolo (eds), State of Play: The 3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG 
Conference (International Commerce and Arbitration) (Eleven International Publishing 2010), 
96. 
2 Mathias Siems, ‘Disgorgement of Profits for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Analysis’ (2003) 7 Edinburgh Law Review 27, 43. 
3 See Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 96.  
4 See for example Jacob S. Ziegel, 'The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales 
Convention: Some Common Law Perspectives', in Galston & Smit (eds), International 
Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Matthew 
Bender 1984), Ch. 9, 8-9. 
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Convention excludes this remedy.5 Therefore, it becomes imperative to 
discuss from a theoretical and practical perspective whether there is any 
scope for allowing the disgorgement of profits under the CISG because, 
as Schwenzer and Hachem have correctly stated, if the CISG fails to adapt 
to the new circumstances and dynamic nature of international trade, it is 
doomed to lose popularity and uniform application.6 
The purpose of this article is to discuss whether and how the 
aggrieved party may be granted the profits made by the breaching party 
under the CISG. The discussion is two-pronged. The first question we will 
try to answer is whether the disgorgement of profits can be inferred from 
an interpretation of the CISG’s existing stipulations, particularly Art. 74, 
in accordance with Art. 7(1) of the Convention. The second question is 
whether there is an internal gap within the Convention and, if so, whether 
this gap can be filled in light of Art. 7(2) of the Convention in a way that 
allows for the disgorgement of profits realized by the aggrieved party. 
Before analyzing whether the breaching party can be successfully 
stripped of their gains under the relevant provisions of the CISG, it would 
be helpful to understand what is meant by the disgorgement of profits 
through a comparative lens. 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE REMEDY OF DISGORGEMENT OF 
PROFITS 
The remedy of disgorgement of profits can be briefly summarized as 
stripping the breaching party of the gains they made through the breach 
of contract. Its contrast with the ordinary remedy of damages is clear: the 
former takes into account the change in the economic position of the 
breaching party, whereas the latter is based on the loss that the innocent 
party has suffered.7 In other words, the first impression that the 
disgorgement remedy gives is that it is not concerned with the position of 
 
5 Milena Djordjevic, ‘Article 74’, in Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales-
Viscassilas (eds), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (2nd 
edn, Beck Hart Nomos 2018) para 61. 
6 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘The Scope of the CISG Provisions on 
Damages’, in Djokhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds), Contract Damages: Domestic 
and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2008), 93. 
7 Djordjevic (n 5), para 62; Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 93; Lionel Smith, ‘Disgorgement of 
the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and Efficient Breach’ (1994) 24 
Canadian Business Law Journal 121, 122; Onni Rostila, Disgorgement and the CISG - 
Comparative and Future Perspectives, Thesis, University of Lapland, Finland, 2017, 13. The 
disgorgement of profits has even been described as the mirror image counterpart (das 
spiegelbildliche Gegenstück) of the damages. See Tobias Helms, Gewinnherausgabe als 
haftungrechtliches Problem (Mohr Siebek 2007) 3. 
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the aggrieved party but rather that of the breaching party. There are two 
crucial questions following this first impression. The first question is 
whether this first impression can be misleading in certain cases. The 
second question is whether the correctness of this first impression should 
completely exclude the possibility of the disgorgement of profits under 
the CISG. In other words, even though the remedy of disgorgement of 
profits may contradict the main principles of compensatory damages, 
should this contradiction be interpreted as meaning that there is no room 
for disgorgement? 
The general approach to the disgorgement of profits implies a certain 
prejudice that this remedy is of a punitive character8 and therefore has no 
place in a system that does not give rise to punitive or preventive remedies 
in the field of private law.9 In fact, this bias can also be seen in comparative 
findings. Generally speaking, the systems that regulate the disgorgement 
remedy one way or another usually permit it only in exceptional 
circumstances and usually in tortious liability cases or in cases of negotiorum 
gestio.10 However, it is usually disregarded that the disgorgement does not 
have to be understood as a sui generis and possibly punitive remedy, but 
also as a way of calculating damages.11 In the latter case, the disgorgement 
of profits is renamed by some authors as “gain-based damages,”12 and this 
choice phrase (which is perhaps at first glance surprising or even 
oxymoronic) articulates that the objective is compensating the aggrieved 
party, even though the position of the breaching party is taken into 
account. When analyzing whether there is a place for disgorgement within 
the Convention’s system of remedies, this distinction always has to be kept 
in mind. Nonetheless, the line between the punitive and compensatory 
types of disgorgement of profits is not always easily drawn. 
 
8 Djordjevic (n 5), para 65. 
9 See e.g., Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts and Mark Czarnecki, ‘Article 74’, in Christoph Brunner 
(ed), UN Kaufrecht- CISG (2nd edn, Stämpfli Verlag 2014) para 18. 
10 For a comparative overview of the disgorgement of profits under various legal systems, 
see Ewoud Hondius and Andre Janssen (eds), Disgorgement of Profits - Gain-Based Remedies 
throughout the World (Springer 2015). For a detailed and comparative study of the concept 
of negotiorum gestio, see Duncan Sheehan, ‘Negotiorum Gestio: A Civilian Concept in the 
Common Law?' (2006) 55 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 253. 
11 Helms (n 7) 5–6, Marius Jan Stucki, Vorteilsherausgabe nach vorsa ̈tzlichen Vertragsverletzungen 
im nationalen und internationalen Recht, Thesis, Universita ̈t Bern, Switzerland, 2018, 83. 
12 See e.g., Djordjevic (n 5), para 63; James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, 
Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing 2002) 21; Jessica Rickett, ‘Disgorgement 
for Breach of Contract: My Loss, Your Gain’ (2001) 9 Auckland University Law Review 375, 
376. 
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Independent of the punitive/preventive or compensatory nature of 
the disgorgement remedy, the goal remains the safeguarding of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. In other words, the disgorgement of profits 
is thought to motivate the parties to fulfill their contractual obligations.13 
From this perspective, the disgorgement remedy seems to be in line with 
CISG Art. 7(1), which sets the observance of good faith in international 
trade as a general goal.14 Due to its limited scope, this article is not the 
right place to discuss what is meant by good faith, as the issue represents 
an eternal debate. However, it would not be wrong to assume that the 
philosophy of the Convention is to prevent or deter opportunistic 
behavior; therefore, Art. 7 may be considered an argument in favor of 
allowing the remedy of disgorgement of profits.15 Nevertheless, another 
important provision that should be considered is Art. 74, which embodies 
the principle of full compensation.16 At first glance, the disgorgement 
remedy appears to contradict Art. 74 of CISG because the former takes 
into account the profits made by the breaching party, whereas the latter 
depends on the loss suffered by the other party. However, there may be 
circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable to calculate the 
loss, or there may be no way other than the disgorgement of profits to 
assure the performance of the contract. 
To assess whether there is any scope for allowing the disgorgement 
of profits under the CISG, this article will take into consideration two 
different scenarios as a starting point. The first is the second sales cases in 
which the seller breaches the contract by selling the promised goods 
(naturally at a higher price) to a third party. The other scenario is the cases 
in which one of the parties breaks a contractual clause related to an issue 
other than the delivery of goods and the payment of the purchase price 
(e.g., a non-compete clause). Some authors refer to the latter as “agency 
problem cases” because they almost always stem from a principal–agent 
problem where the party to the contract is not in an optimal position to 
monitor a potential breach by the other.17 At the risk of reducing the 
excitement of the reader, perhaps it should be stated that the remedy of 
 
13 Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 93. 
14 Edgardo Muñoz and David Obey Ament-Guemez, ‘Calculation of Damages on the 
Basis of the Breaching Party’s Profits under the CISG’ (2017) 8 Journal of International 
Commercial Law 201, 208; Florence Eicher, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda: Contrasting 
Disgorgement Damages with Efficient Breaches under Article 74 CISG’ (2018) LSE Law 
Review 29, 33. 
15 See Eicher (n 14), 35. 
16 Schmidt-Ahrendts and Czarnecki (n 9), para 8. 
17 Katy Barnett, Accounting for Breach of Contract: Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing 2012), 
4. 
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disgorgement of profits finds meaning (and more importantly, legitimacy) 
only in cases where the damages become dysfunctional or inadequate to 
remedy a breach,18 which is, in fact, the common characteristic shared by 
these two scenarios. 
3. THE CASE OF SECOND SALES 
A frequently encountered breach of a sales contract is when the seller 
resells the goods that were promised to the first buyer beforehand. The 
seller does this knowing full well that they will have to compensate the 
buyer’s loss, but they proceed with a second sale anyway because they will 
most likely profit despite the compensation obligation.19 In other words, 
the seller — usually a merchant who is supposed to be a homo economicus — 
breaches the contract because they believe it is economically profitable or 
efficient to do so. In principle, in the case of such a breach of contract, 
the compensation of the buyer for the loss suffered is the sufficiently 
adequate remedy, and the disgorgement of profits is not necessary at first 
sight.20 However, there may be situations in which the compensatory 
damages fail to remedy the breach and put the buyer in an equivalent 
economic position as if there had been no breach. It is in those cases 
exactly that the remedy of disgorgement of profits may be allocated a 
compensatory role. 
The typical situation wherein the criterion of “loss suffered” fails to 
provide adequate compensation for the buyer in the case of a second sale 
is when the goods are of a unique nature.21 It goes without saying that the 
concept of uniqueness can be understood in different ways and there is 
no universal guide for its interpretation. In our view, uniqueness shall 
always be correlated with the possibility of substitution.22 The possibility 
of substitution means that the goods are purchasable from another seller, 
even if they might be sold at a higher price and/or under less favorable 
contractual conditions. If the goods are bought at a higher price than in 
the original contract, the difference in the price constitutes at least part of 
the damages. A custom-designed energy turbine, a special type, and 
vintage of wine or a piece of art may all be non-substitutable. In all of 
these cases, the price of the resale contract may be thought of as equal to 
 
18 See also Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies’ 
(2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law Review 55, 55–6. 
19 Muñoz and Ament-Guemez (n 14), 205. 
20 Barnett (n 17), 94. See also Anne Florence Bock, Gewinnherausgabe als Folge einer 
Vertragsverletzung (Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag 2010), 56. 
21 Barnett (n 17), 94. 
22 See Barnett (n 17), 94 ff. 
NJCL 2020/2 25 
 
 
the loss that the aggrieved party has suffered because there is no other way 
to calculate the loss.23 
Granting the aggrieved party the chance to strip the seller of the 
profits made from the second sale is (in exceptional cases such as these) 
in line with the principle of full compensation embodied in Art. 74. The 
principle of full compensation - usually put forward as a counterargument 
for the disgorgement of profits24 - requires that the aggrieved party not be 
overcompensated because of the breach of contract. In other words, if the 
breaching party has made a profit, even though they are obliged to 
compensate the aggrieved party, such an economically efficient 
transaction should be respected.25 Nevertheless, as much as the principle 
of full compensation can be interpreted as an obstacle to the possibility of 
granting the disgorgement of profits, the opposite reasoning can also be 
deduced in exceptional cases. That is because the mirror image of the 
prevention of overcompensation is the prevention of undercompensation. 
As expressly noted by the CISG Advisory Council in their 6th opinion, 
Art. 74 of the CISG aims to “compensate the aggrieved party for all the 
disadvantages suffered as a result of the breach.”26 Hence, if not taking 
into account the gains made by the party in breach of contract will result 
in undercompensation of the aggrieved party, such a path should be 
allowed. This is, as mentioned above, first and foremost the case in the 
sale of unique goods. In these cases, the remedy of disgorgement of profits 
is not only in line with the principle of full compensation but also the most 
efficient way of calculating damages.27 The basic idea is that if the seller 
was able to find an alternative purchaser at a higher price, the buyer could 
have too.28 This reasoning alone proves that the compensation-only 
dogma (as Burrows puts it) is not corroborated by either the principles or 
policies of the Convention.29 
 
23 See Djordjevic (n 5), para 62. 
24 Djordjevic (n 5), para 63; Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 93. 
25 It is usually stated that the disgorgement of profits is an inefficient remedy in contract 
law according to cost analysis because it prevents a more efficient allocation of resources. 
For a thorough discussion on this topic, see Sidney DeLong, ‘The Efficiency of a 
Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract’ (1989) 22 Indiana Law Review 737. 
26 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: 
Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, 
Pennsylvania, USA. 
27 DeLong (n 25), 747. See also Muñoz and Ament-Guemez (n 14), 212. 
28 DeLong (n 25), 748. 
29 Andrew Burrows, ‘Are “Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis” Compensatory, 
Restitutionary, or Neither?’, in Djokhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds), Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2008), 175 ff. 
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We believe that the uniqueness of the resold goods would not be the 
problematic part of assessing the possibility of substitution. What is more 
challenging is to decide whether the disgorgement of profits shall be 
allowed in cases where the goods are not of a unique nature, but they are 
also not easily substitutable due to special circumstances. The famous 
Adras case before the Supreme Court of Israel represents an interesting 
example of the latter scenario.30 It should be noted that even though the 
Adras case was not governed by the CISG but by its predecessor, the 
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
('ULIS'), and the decision regarding the disgorgement of profits was not 
based on ULIS but on national law on unjust enrichment, the facts remain 
interesting for our discussion. 
In the Adras case, an Israeli buyer and a German seller agreed on the 
sale of 7,000 tonnes of iron. The delivery was delayed and ultimately only 
partially performed due to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war. The seller 
then sold the remaining iron to a local buyer at a higher price. The buyer 
succeeded in stripping the seller of the profits made through the resale of 
the goods. The grounds on which the judgment was given will not be 
discussed here as they are principally concerned with the availability of 
recourse to domestic rules on unjust enrichment despite the presence of a 
contract, rather than the availability of the disgorgement of profits in case 
of a breach of contract in the context of the ULIS itself. Allow us to twist 
the facts of the case slightly in order to demonstrate what is problematic 
in terms of the issue of substitutability. 
In our hypothetical Adras-like case, the German seller agrees to sell 
7,000 tonnes of iron to an Israeli buyer, and due to the outbreak of war, 
no one else can either produce or sell iron to the buyers in this country. 
The German seller opportunistically breaches the contract and sells the 
iron to another buyer at a higher price. Could the buyer in the first contract 
have a claim on this sale’s price? We believe that the answer to this 
question should be affirmative, not because the goods are unique (they 
are, in fact, qualified as generic goods), but because they are not easily 
substitutable from elsewhere under the given conditions. Therefore, as it 
is not possible for the buyer to prove their loss based on a concrete or 
abstract cover transaction, the second sale shall be taken as a handle point 
in assessing the quantum of loss.31 
 
30 Adras Chmorey Binyan v. Harlow & Jones GmbH, Supreme Court of Israel, 2 November 
1988, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/881102i5.html. 
31 It should be noted that, in the context of second sales, restricting the application of the 
remedy of disgorgement of profits to cases in which the goods are not easily substitutable 
is in line with the principle of mitigation of loss embodied in Art. 77 of the CISG, which 
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 The comparative findings also support allowing the disgorgement 
of profits as a means of calculating loss (i.e., the gain-based damages). We 
see perhaps the most explicit recognition of gain-based damages in Dutch 
law.32 Under the Dutch Civil Code Art. 6:104, in case of compensation for 
loss arising from contractual or tortious liability, if the judge deems it fair, 
they may allow the disgorgement of profits on the condition that the 
aggrieved party makes such a request. This rule is especially important if 
the amount of the loss cannot be proved and/or if the aggrieved party has 
incurred significantly less loss compared to the gains made by the 
breaching party. 
However, it should be noted that the stipulation under the Dutch 
Civil Code is exceptional.33 For instance, neither the German Civil Code 
(BGB), the Swiss Code of Obligations (OR)34 nor the Turkish Code of 
Obligations (TCO)35 expressly approves this method of calculating loss. 
According to Art. 50/II of the TCO and Art. 42/II of the OR, “Where 
the exact value of the loss or damage cannot be quantified, the court shall 
estimate the value at its discretion in the light of the normal course of 
events (…).” On the other hand, these provisions that give significantly 
wide discretion to judges do not prohibit taking into account the profits 
made by the breaching party when assessing the quantum of damages. 
Therefore, it would not be wrong to conclude that a judge may use their 
 
stipulates that “a party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss....”. In the case of second sales, this 
means that the aggrieved party shall, within an appropriate period of time and at a 
reasonable price, purchase substitute goods in order to keep their loss as low as possible. 
It has been (in our view rightfully) put forward that the general availability of the 
disgorgement of profits in cases of second sales would disincentivize the aggrieved parties 
to mitigate the loss. Therefore, the principle of mitigation requires limited recourse to the 
remedy of disgorgement of profits, as suggested by this article. In common law 
scholarship, one may encounter another distinction, namely the one between contracts 
concerning particular or determined goods and those concerning indeterminate instances 
of a type of a thing. According to this distinction, if the contract of sales was related, the 
disgorgement remedy does not apply (e.g., in the sale of bushels of merchantable wheat, 
because no particular wheat was promised). See, e.g., Nicholas W. Sage, ‘Disgorgement: 
From Property to Contract’ (2016) 66 University of Toronto Law Journal 244, 253–5. We 
believe that this distinction cannot be applied either in principle or authority to the CISG. 
32 Stucki (n 11), 84. 
33 Stucki (n 11), 84; Bock (n 20), 135. 
34 Bock (n 20), 135; Ece Baş Süzel, Gerçek Olmayan Vekaletsiz İş Görme - Menfaat Devri 
Yaptırımı (On Iki Levha 2015), 157 ff. 
35 Other than Art. 50/II of TCO, there are special regulations regarding gain-based 
damages under Turkish law. See Baş Süzel (n 34), 157 ff. 
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discretion to strip the breaching party of the profits made through the 
breach in the name of compensation36. 
When it comes to German Law, §285 BGB sheds light on the 
possibility of the disgorgement of profits in the case of second sales.37 
According to this section, if the seller has sold the unique or nonfungible 
goods initially promised to the buyer to a third party, the original buyer 
has a right to claim the substitute performance (i.e., the profits made by 
the breaching party).38 However, it should be recognized that, in cases 
beyond the scope of impossibility and §285 BGB, the current standing of 
the German doctrine seems rather in opposition to the disgorgement of 
profits.39 
In English law, the disgorgement of profits for breach of contract 
can be considered a rather recent development following the 
groundbreaking decision made by the House of Lords in 2000.40 However, 
it should not go without saying that, in English law, one of the main 
requisites for gain-based damages is the inadequacy of the remedy of 
compensatory damages.41 In other words, the disgorgement of profits is 
considered a subsidiary remedy or supplementary method that adds to the 
already existing and conventional remedies.42 
 
36 See, e.g., Stucki (n 10), 83–5 for Swiss law and Baş Süzel (n 34), 157 ff for Turkish law. 
37 See Helms (n 7) 310; Franz Hofmann, ‘Gewinnherausgabe bei Vertragsverletzungen’ 
(2013) 213 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 469, 477 ff.; Reinhard Zimmermann, 
‘Damages and Interest’, in Reinhard Zimmermann and Nils Jansen (eds), Commentaries on 
European Contract Laws (OUP 2018), 1464. 
38 Siems (n 2), 36 ff. 
39 In German law, the principle is the same as in Turkish/Swiss law, which is full 
compensation and a sum equal to the loss. According to §249 BGB, “A person who is 
liable in damages must restore the position that would exist if the circumstance obliging 
him to pay damages had not occurred.” Regarding the loss of profits, there is a special 
regulation in §252 BGB: “The damage to be compensated for also comprises the lost 
profits. Those profits are considered lost that in the normal course of events or in the 
special circumstances, particularly due to the measures and precautions taken, could 
probably be expected.” To ask for a loss of profit, the aggrieved party only needs to prove 
the circumstances that give rise to the probability of profit without a loss event. The 
prevailing view suggests that the profits of the breaching party cannot be claimed as 
damages. 
40 Attorney General v. Blake and Another [2000] UKHL 45; [2000] 4 All ER 385; [2000] 3 
WLR 625 (27th July, 2000). 
41 Edelman (n 12), 154; Solène Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Protection of Performance (OUP 2012), 157. 
42 Rowan (n 41), 158. 
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4. THE CASE OF BREACH OF OBLIGATION OTHER THAN THE 
DELIVERY OF THE GOODS AND PAYMENT OF THE 
PURCHASE PRICE 
The other scenario in which the disgorgement of profits may be used 
as an efficient and adequate remedy in case of a breach of a sales contract 
is when one of the parties breaches an obligation other than the primary 
obligations, namely the delivery of the goods and the payment of the 
purchase price. Such a breach usually (but not necessarily) occurs when 
one of the parties breaches a negative provision of the contract, such as 
the obligation not to resell the goods within a certain time limit or, in 
certain areas, the obligation not to violate fair-trade standards or the 
obligation not to employ children during the production process, etc. As 
mentioned before, some authors refer to them as “agency problem cases” 
because they almost always include problems of information asymmetry 
and monitoring difficulties, which are inherent in the general concept of 
the principal–agent problem.43 
Correlating cases of this type with the remedy of disgorgement of 
profits seems more controversial than the previous category of second 
sales. That is because the preventive character of the disgorgement of 
profits makes its presence more strongly felt, and these cases bring into 
mind what common law lawyers refer to as “restitution for wrongs,”44 
which is based on the idea that no one shall be permitted to profit from 
their wrongdoing.45 More clearly, it invites notions of prevention and 
punishment. 
The obvious commonality between this line of cases and the 
previous category of second sales is the difficulty in calculating and 
proving the loss. If the seller breaches the negative contractual stipulation 
of non-compete and sells the goods to someone else, could the buyer 
claim the disgorgement of the profits the seller made through the sale? If 
the seller violates a contractual clause foreseeing that the seller has to 
comply with certain fair-trade rules or a prohibition regarding the 
 
43 Barnett (n 17), 118. 
44 Rickett (n 12) 376. For a similar expression, see Smith (n 6) 121 ff. 
45 John D. McCamus, ‘Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(2003) 36 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 943, 945; Edelman (n 12), 81. See also 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 6 (n 25) para 2.4: “Furthermore, from a policy perspective, the 
breaching party should not be able to escape liability because the breaching party’s 
wrongful act caused the difficulty in proving damages with absolute certainty.” Even 
Posner, who is one of the pioneers of the efficient breach doctrine, has stated that an 
exception should be made for opportunistic breaches of contract and disgorgement of 
profits shall be allowed in these cases. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 
(5th edn, Aspen Law & Business 1998), 130–1.  
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employment of children, could the buyer strip the seller of any gains that 
are equal to the savings the seller made as a result of this breach? Allow us 
to make a circular argument and start the reasoning from the result. 
Assuming that the parties have not agreed on a penalty or liquidated 
damages clause in their contract, if the aggrieved party fails to prove or 
fully calculate the loss that they have suffered following the breach of such 
a contractual stipulation, unless the judge or arbitrator allows the 
disgorgement of profits the breaching party has made, the violated 
contractual clause has no economic value and is no different from a mere 
compilation of words with no legal force. The contractual stipulation only 
has an economic value if the aggrieved party is substantially compensated 
one way or another. In other words, the remedy of disgorgement of profits 
in these cases seems in line with the hypothetical intention and agreement 
of the parties, which admittedly lends some weight to the implied 
contractual clause argument.46 
The parties to an international sales contract are by definition 
merchants.47 That means that if the parties have agreed on a contractual 
clause providing for a non-compete deal or prohibiting the use of child 
workers, for example, this should be considered as reflected in the contract 
price.48 It follows that the buyer or the seller, upon agreeing to a 
contractual stipulation related to an issue other than the delivery of the 
goods and the payment of the price for the goods, has paid an extra 
premium. The presumed existence of this premium indicates that the 
parties also wished for this obligation to be performed or, in the case of 
non-performance, for an adequate remedy to be granted. The parties are 
in principle free to contract a penalty clause or liquidated damages, but 
even if they fail to do so, this shall not mean that they have waived any 
pecuniary outcome for the breach.49 Therefore, the remedy of 
disgorgement of profits seems perfectly in line with the hypothetical 
intention of the parties, which begs the question: is it in line with the 
general principles of the Convention? 
It would not be wrong to say that the question of the availability of 
disgorgement of profits is only one part of the wider problem of the 
 
46 See, e.g., Richard O’Dair, ‘Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the 
Theory of Efficient Breach: Some Reflections’ (1993) 46 Current Legal Problems 113, 122 
ff. 
47 Article 2/1(a) of the CISG excludes consumer sales. 
48 See Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 101. 
49 See also Hofmann (n 37), 503–4. 
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applicability of what is referred to as the performance principle.50 The 
developing recognition of the enforcement of performance interests has 
also given rise to the broader availability of the disgorgement remedy, 
especially in common law countries.51 Unlike the economic benefits 
principle, the performance interest principle takes into account what the 
creditor could have reasonably expected from the performance of the 
contract.52 The traces of this principle can be easily found in various 
articles of the Convention, such as Art. 46, which provides for a claim for 
repair or replacement in case of defective performance. This indicates that 
the Convention does not simply reduce the contractual claims to 
pecuniary loss but adopts a wider approach that lends support to the 
performance interests of the aggrieved parties. 
This deduction is also closely related to the preferred philosophical 
approach to the concept of a contract in a given system. If a system looks 
at contracts from the perspective of Holmes,53 which assumes that a 
contract gives the breaching party an option between performing or 
paying damages, it would be difficult to argue that the remedy of 
disgorgement of profits has a leg to stand on in this system — at least not 
as a remedy for a breach of contract simpliciter.54 However, if a system adds 
a moral element to the contract or makes the safeguarding of the contract 
one of its principal objectives, either to increase trust in the system or to 
reduce transaction costs and overall economic waste, then the 
disgorgement of profits may have a place in the given system. This 
principle, also known as pacta sunt servanda (which is one of the general 
 
50 See Brian Coote, ‘Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest’ (1997) 56 
The Cambridge Law Journal 537, 541; Schwenzer and Hachem (n 5), 93 ff; Ingeborg 
Scwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christopher Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law (OUP 
2012), paras 44.22 ff. For a critical approach to the relationship between the performance 
principle and gain-based awards, see Rowan (n 41), 160 ff. 
51 Sage (n 31), 244. 
52 See also Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 50) paras 44.27 ff. The fact that the damages 
for a breach of contract under the CISG are based on the expectation interest principle 
supports this view. See Rostila (n 6), 3. 
53 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462: 
“the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it,- and nothing else.”  
54 Our anaylsis in this article is limited to cases of breach of a sales contract, thus a contract 
simpliciter. This is important because it essentially takes the morality argument out of the 
equation, unlike the breach of a fiduciary relationship. Even though the concept of an 
opportunistic or cynical breach can also appear in sales contract cases, making a 
distinction between different types of breaches seems in line with neither the principles 
of the Convention nor the practicability requirements. See also McCamus (n 45), 961. 
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principles of the Convention),55 necessitates the refusal of the first view 
that oversimplifies the contract as an option between performance or 
compensation and provides for at least a prima facie approval of the 
disgorgement of profits as a remedy available under the CISG.56 
As noted earlier, in case of a second sale of unique or non-
substitutable goods, the disgorgement of the profits made through the 
breach does not in itself contradict the damages-only perspective (in other 
words, the economic benefit principle). However, the issue becomes more 
complicated in case of a breach of a contractual stipulation other than the 
delivery of goods or the payment of the price because determining the 
economic benefit tied to the specific contractual clause can be difficult 
unless the parties have agreed on a penalty clause or liquidated damages. 
Schwenzer and Hachem argue that almost every contractual clause 
has a determinable market value.57 According to them, if the seller 
breaches a contractual stipulation, such as the prohibition of employing 
children, the loss suffered can be easily determined, as there is also a 
market for goods sold by the sellers who employ children. This may seem 
correct at first sight; however, it begs the question of how such market 
value is to be proven. It is one thing to accept that the buyer has a 
performance interest that should be safeguarded, and the disgorgement of 
the profits made by the breaching party assures this; it is another thing to 
look for the market price of the goods produced or sold under the 
circumstances that were meant to be avoided in the contract. 
The value allocated to contractual stipulations of this kind does not 
always constitute a competitive element; hence, it is not always calculable. 
More clearly, the existence of an assumed premium paid by the parties 
does not always mean that this premium is quantifiable or equal to any 
similar commercial transaction. We believe that the difficulty and 
sometimes impossibility of determining the market value of the breach is 
the main reason why the disgorgement of profits should be considered the 
most suitable remedy in this category of cases. However, the difference 
between this line of thought and the one put forth for the first category 
of cases should be underlined. This theoretical distinction is further 
elaborated below. 
 
55 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Die allgemeinen Grundsätze im UN-Kaufrecht’ (1995) 59 Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 469, 480. 
56 See Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 93. 
57 Schwenzer and Hachem (n 5), 96. 
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5. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS AS A WAY OF CALCULATING 
LOSS OR AS A REMEDY ON ITS OWN 
The disgorgement of profits as the odd one out is a direct result of 
the fact that the concept of disgorgement is insufficiently understood by 
the courts, lawyers, and scholars.58 There is no general consensus on when 
it can or should be awarded and under what conditions. In this part, we 
try to clarify that there are two possible (and not mutually exclusive) ways 
of understanding and adapting the disgorgement of profits under the 
Convention. Before moving forward with these explications, it should be 
underlined that the inadequacies of compensatory damages represent the 
point of origin for both. In other words, as Weinrib has correctly stated, 
the disgorgement of profits cannot be considered in isolation from the 
goals and the possible ineffectiveness or insufficiency of the remedy of 
damages.59 
As mentioned above, the discussion of the compatibility of the 
disgorgement of profits with the CISG may follow two possible paths. 
The first possibility is to accept that the availability of the disgorgement of 
profits can be deduced from an in-depth and accurate interpretation of 
the Convention’s articles in light of Art. 7(1).60 To be more precise, this 
part of the discussion is concerned with the fitness of the disgorgement 
of profits in one of its articles, which in our case is Art. 74 on damages.61 
The question is, therefore, whether the wording and the ratio legis of Art. 
74 permit the judge or arbitrator to award the disgorgement of profits 
made by the breaching party. We have concluded that such an 
interpretation of Art. 74 is possible; however, it should be restricted to 
exceptional cases.62 
The most typical example of this set of cases is when the seller sells 
the promised goods to a third-party buyer, often at a higher price than in 
the first contract. In this type of case, the loss suffered by the aggrieved 
party is generally calculable, either through the price of a cover transaction 
(which is also referred to as the concrete method)63 or the market price 
 
58 On the same view for common law systems, see Sage (n 31), 245. 
59 Weinrib (n 18), 55. 
60 See e.g. Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 92. 
61 See Muñoz and Ament-Guemez (n 14), 205 ff. 
62 Muñoz and Ament-Guemez (n 14), 205–6. 
63 See Article 75 of the CISG. On the issue of whether the price difference between the 
first contract and the cover transaction could be claimed even if the contract were not 
avoided, see Peter Schlechtriem and Petra Butler, UN Law on International Sales (Springer 
2009), 216 ff. 
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(the abstract method).64 If a convincing calculation through one of those 
methods is possible, then there is no need to discuss whether the profits 
made through the breach can be taken as a starting point for the 
quantification of loss. This would only be relevant if the loss were 
incalculable without taking the second sale price into account. As 
mentioned above, in an economic world where almost every type of good 
that can be the subject of an international sales contract has a determinable 
price, only the second sales of unique or non-substitutable goods would 
be relevant for assessing the applicability of the disgorgement of profits. 
Even though the observance of good faith in international trade is 
one of the main objectives of the Convention, it does not follow that it 
aims to deter every kind of breach of contract. In other words, if the buyer 
is put in the same economic position as they would have been had the 
breach not occurred, despite the undercompensation risk that is 
embedded in the remedy of damages,65 the wording and the rationale of 
Art. 74 require damages to be the primary and default remedy. However, 
when it comes to goods that cannot be the subject of a cover transaction 
or those without a market price (in other words, in those cases where the 
aforementioned common methods of calculation of loss fail to function), 
the interpretation of Art. 74 in light of Art. 7(1) of the Convention, which 
requires that good faith in international trade shall be observed, permits 
us to conclude that the profits made by the breaching party can also be 
taken into account as a subsidiary procedure. 
On the other hand, the same justification cannot always be easily 
made for the second category of cases, where one of the parties breaches 
a contractual stipulation related to an issue other than the delivery of 
goods or the payment of the price. That is because the loss suffered by the 
aggrieved party may not always be determinable unless they have agreed 
on a specific sum for the breach. Needless to say, every case has to be 
assessed on its own and with regard to the specific circumstances. For 
instance, even though the disgorgement of profits and the damages 
remedy under Art. 74 seem reconcilable in case of the violation of a non-
compete clause, the same is not true for the violation of a clause against 
the employment of children. That is why, in this line of cases, the 
disgorgement of profits shall be considered a remedy on its own or as a 
subsidiary remedy separate from the remedy of compensatory damages. 
 
64 See Art. 76 of the CISG.  
65 Bock (n 20), 115 ff.; Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman, ‘You Do Have to Keep Promises: 
A Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies’ (2011) 52 William and Mary Law Review 
1181, 1185. 
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In the case of a breach of a non-compete clause, the same argument 
that is usually made for the second sale of unique goods can be convincing, 
which is that if the seller sold it to a third-party buyer at a higher price, the 
buyer could have too.66 Therefore, the difference between two contract 
prices (which is practically equal to the profits made by the seller) is 
equivalent to the hypothetical loss suffered by the aggrieved buyer. Similar 
reasoning can be applied to the breach of a non-compete clause. However, 
for the breach of a non-compete clause, the aggrieved party could have 
sold or bought the goods in the relevant market or during the relevant 
period at the price of the contract with the third party. Hence, the profits 
made through the breach may be considered equal to the loss suffered by 
the contracting party. More clearly, the broad interpretation of Art. 74, 
which permits the profits made by the breaching party to serve as a starting 
point for the calculation of loss, is again applicable in this line of cases.67 
However, as Smith puts it, “so long as we remain convinced that the 
compensation is the only response available for breach of contract, 
intractable problems arise.”68 Since the CISG is only concerned with 
international sales contracts, the number of these intractable problems is 
naturally lower than in the general contract law, but they exist nonetheless. 
If the rules of compensation fail to address this type of problem, then the 
solution must be sought elsewhere. Our view is that the disgorgement of 
remedies, as a remedy on its own, can be awarded under the CISG without 
having recourse to national laws. In other words, the non-regulation of 
the disgorgement of profits under the CISG indicates that there is an 
internal gap within the Convention and this gap should be filled in 
accordance with the general principles on which the Convention is based, 
in accordance with Art. 7(2). 
Various underlying reasons for allowing the disgorgement of profits 
may be identified. One of the cornerstones of this remedy is the fairness 
and equitable concerns that it satisfies.69 The laissez-faire approach is shared 
by the Convention only to the extent that the aggrieved party is provided 
with an adequate remedy. In other words, in cases where the damages or 
other legal remedies fail to safeguard a reasonable balance between the 
parties, the disgorgement of profits may step in as a subsidiary remedy in 
order to reinstate the disturbed contractual balance. One can think of at 
least three arguments in favor of this standpoint. 
 
66 See Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 98–9; Stucki (n 11), 83. 
67 Ingborg Schwenzer, ‘Artikel 74’, in Peter Schlechtriem, Ingeborg Schwenzer and Ulrich 
Schröter (eds), Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht (7th edn, CH Beck 2019), para 43. 
68 Smith (n 6) 125. 
69 Bock (n 20), 100; Hofmann (n 37), 484. 
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First of all, claiming otherwise would easily cloud the uniform 
application goal of the Convention. The CISG is currently applied to 
international sales contracts concluded between buyers and sellers located 
in 93 countries.70 This constitutes a significant segment of the globe, and 
the number of contracting states continues to rise. It follows that the 
disputes arising from the Convention can be brought before the courts of 
93 jurisdictions in addition to the arbitral tribunals. Therefore, the uniform 
application of the Convention (which is also expressly mentioned in Art. 
7(1)) is imperative for the Convention to serve its purpose and remain 
functional.71 In other words, claiming that there is an external gap in the 
CISG that should be filled in accordance with national law rules should be 
considered the very last resort.72 If an alternative solution can be found 
within the limits of the Convention, this should be the principal path to 
take. Claiming that the disgorgement of profits cannot be found within 
the set of rules of the Convention would undermine its comprehensive 
character. Therefore, considering the issue of disgorgement of profits as a 
question governed by (but not expressly settled by) the Convention would 
be in line with the goal of promotion of uniformity. 
Furthermore, allowing the breaching party to gain from the breach 
to the detriment of the aggrieved party and leaving the latter worse off 
would also be against the spirit of the Convention. It would not be wrong 
to state that the CISG is based on the idea of finding an effective and fine 
balance between parties’ interests. For instance, while Art. 46 gives the 
buyer the right to require performance, Art. 48 gives the seller the right to 
a cure. While Art. 49 gives the buyer the right to avoid the contract, it also 
restricts it crucially through the doctrines of fundamental breach and 
Nachfrist. An overall evaluation of the rights and remedies regulated under 
the Convention shows that it tries to walk a thin line between the interests 
of both the seller and the buyer. If the disgorgement of profits is not 
allowed, and in cases where the ordinary compensation mechanism fails 
to function (either because the loss is incalculable or unprovable), that 
would mean that the breaching party is allowed to keep all the gains made 
through the breach and the aggrieved party has to be consoled with merely 
non-pecuniary remedies (e.g., avoidance of the contract). 
 
70 https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg/status 
71 Schmidt-Ahrendts (n 1), 95.  
72 See also Felix Hartmann, ‘Ersatzherausgabe und Gewinnhaftung beim internationalen 
Warenkauf: Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Einfluss des UN-Kaufrechts auf die Entwicklung 
eines ku ̈nftigen europa ̈ischen Vertragsrechts’ (2009) Internationales Handelsrecht 189, 
190. 
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Last but not least, allowing the disgorgement of profits may also 
manifest as a matter of justice.73 The remedy of disgorgement of profits is 
based on the idea that the breaching party shall not benefit from their own 
wrongdoing.74 Corrective justice considerations, which also form the basis 
for the remedy of damages,75 may make it necessary to disgorge the 
breaching party of the profits in certain cases. As is well known, the main 
logic of corrective justice dictates that a given remedy should aim to undo 
the breach and correct it in a preferred way, usually in terms of monetary 
compensation in contract law.76 To be deemed fair from the corrective 
justice perspective, the damages must also “be the measure of the wrong,” 
which is broadly the breach of contract.77 Therefore, if the injustice 
stemming from the breach of contract cannot be sufficiently remedied 
through the award of damages (as in the aforementioned examples), then 
another remedial form representing the rights and interests of the 
aggrieved party shall come into play. In other words, in cases where the 
compensatory damages fail to remedy the breach, it makes sense from the 
perspective of corrective justice to allow the disgorgement of profits as a 
subsidiary remedy in order to correct the disturbed contractual balance. 
As Edelman has said, “to do otherwise would be to legitimate the 
wrong.”78 
One might think that allocating a preventive and corrective role to 
the contractual remedies would make sense only in a system that takes the 
presence and the degree of the breaching party’s fault into account.79 
Therefore, the preventive purpose may never stand under the Convention 
since it adapts a strict liability approach and, in principle, rejects the 
assessment of fault. However, when further consideration is given to this 
deduction, the opposite conclusion seems also possible. Even though the 
Convention’s remedial system is not based on the fault element, there are 
some breaches of contract that are by their very nature linked to wrongful 
behavior. The breach of a negative covenant would be a prime example of 
this. How can the debtor violate a contractual stipulation where they 
promise not to do something without any fault? It requires a high level of 
imagination to think of such a breach. Therefore, we believe that the 
 
73 Siems (n 2), 49.  
74 Weinrib (n 18), 73. 
75 Rostila (n 6), 29. 
76 See Weinrib (n 18), 59–60. See also Rostila (n 6), 27. 
77 Weinrib (n 18), 75.  
78 Edelman (n 12), 81. See also Hofmann (n 37), 491–3. 
79 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 50), para 44.09. On this discussion, see also Rostila (n 
6), 14. 
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absence of the fault requirement in the CISG’s remedial system cannot be 
perceived as an argument against the allocation of preventive objectives 
to the damages remedy and the allowance of the disgorgement of profits 
in certain cases. 
On a final note, the existing literature has argued that Art. 84(2) of 
the CISG may be applied per analogiam in order to support the 
disgorgement claims. 80 Art. 81(2) stipulates that in case of avoidance of 
contract, both parties are required to restitute what they have obtained 
from the other, and Art. 84 regulates how this restitution will take place. 
If the object of the restitution is money, then the seller must pay interest. 
If the object of the restitution is the delivered goods, then the buyer must 
return these goods. In the latter scenario, if the buyer has profited from 
the goods that they are obliged to return, then these profits must also be 
restituted. According to some authors, the obligation to account for all the 
benefits derived from these goods may be considered an analogical basis 
for allowing the disgorgement of profits.81 However, we do not share this 
view. The ratio legis of Art. 84 and the remedy of disgorgement of profits 
diverge. The disgorgement of profits is related to the profits made in 
relation to the breach, whereas a link between the breach and the profits 
is not necessary according to Art. 84(2), which provides for the return of 
the profits (e.g., the legal and natural fruits) with the goods. The position 
of the buyer — or more clearly, whether the avoidance was caused by the 
breach committed by the buyer or the seller — also has no bearing on the 
application of Art. 84(2).82 
 
 
80 See, e.g., Hartmann (n 72), 191 ff; Eicher (n 14), 33 ff. 
81 Hartmann (n 72), 191 ff; Eicher (n 14), 33 ff. Art. 84(2) stipulates that “(2) The buyer 
must account to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods or part 
of them: (a) if he must make restitution of the goods or part of them; or (b) if it is 
impossible for him to make restitution of all or part of the goods or to make restitution 
of all or part of the goods substantially in the condition in which he received them, but 
he has nevertheless declared the contract avoided or required the seller to deliver 
substitute goods.” 
82 Christiana Fountoulakis, ‘Artikel 84’, in Peter Schlechtriem, Ingeborg Schwenzer and 
Ulrich Schröter (eds), Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht (7th edn, CH Beck 2019), para 22. 
